America’s law enforcement system is at a crossroads.
During the course of the past year, cities around the country have been rocked by wave after wave of protests following police-involved shootings. Now that a Minneapolis jury has held former police officer Derek Chauvin responsible for the killing of George Floyd, the national conversation has again turned to police reforms.
It’s clear something must be done to address wrongs and reestablish trust between communities and law enforcement officers, while also protecting the reputations of the majority of officers who serve honorably every day.
A majority of Americans from both political parties support some reform. In fact, 95% of Americans from both sides of the aisle support changing management policies to hold officers more accountable for their actions.1
But that’s easier said than done. Police union contracts stand in the way.
Take a closer look at the Chauvin case. In May 2020, Chauvin pinned Floyd to the ground, with a knee to his neck, for nearly nine minutes as Floyd begged to be allowed to breathe. Bystanders captured Floyd’s death with their phones, allowing a worldwide audience to view the horrendous scene.2
It was later revealed that Chauvin had used fatal force before and had at least 17 prior complaints filed against him. Sixteen of the complaints were closed without discipline; a 17th simply resulted in two letters of reprimand.3
It raises the question: Why was Chauvin still on the force?
The likely answer is the same one challenging police departments all over the country: police union contracts stand in the way, making it difficult for police chiefs to get rid of problem officers.4
That’s exactly the situation in Illinois. A 2017 report by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois found that of 30,000 misconduct complaints in Chicago in the preceding five years, nearly half were never investigated by the city. Fewer than 2% were sustained – meaning there was no discipline following 98% of the complaints.5
The report found “a number of institutional barriers contribute to this fact,” including “provisions in the City’s agreements with the unions that impede the investigative process.”6
But it isn’t just that police union contracts can hinder investigations; it goes beyond that. Illinois state law actually allows union contracts – including the provisions hindering investigations – to overpower other state laws.
Hidden near the end of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, or IPLRA, is a provision entitled “Act Takes Precedence.”[7] That section explicitly details that when a contract between a government unit – such as a police department – and a union is in conflict with any other law or regulation, the contract prevails.
That means the state could enact groundbreaking legislation addressing the inadequacies of internal investigations and giving police departments the power to appropriately discipline officer misconduct, but police unions could subvert those efforts by writing contrary provisions into union contracts.8
These problematic provisions aren’t just found in the Chicago Police contract.
Various provisions carrying the power to undermine internal investigations and discipline are found in the police union contracts in the next 10 largest municipalities in Illinois: Aurora, Naperville, Joliet, Rockford, Springfield, Elgin, Peoria, Champaign, Waukegan and Cicero.
These include provisions prohibiting anonymity of complaints, provisions restricting interrogations of accused officers, provisions providing special information to accused officers, provisions subjecting discipline to a lengthy appeal procedure and provisions hiding investigations from subsequent review.
Until the IPLRA is amended and Section 15 no longer allows union contracts to carry the weight of law, those contracts will continue to render meaningless the good intentions of police reform advocates.
The time is right for such reforms. Recent polling suggests most Illinois households – including union households – think the provision in Section 15 giving police contracts more power than law should be changed.9
Now it’s time for the Illinois General Assembly to act.
Police union contracts carry more weight than state law
Illinois has statutorily allowed collective bargaining between unions and state and local government employers since 1983, when the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was enacted.10 The purpose of the act was to regulate labor relations between public employers and employees.11
But buried deep in the act is a provision that gives unions, including police unions, extensive power.
Section 15 of the IPLRA explicitly states union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements trump all other state laws and regulations:
Sec. 15. Act Takes Precedence.
(a) In case of any conflict between the provisions of this Act and any other law (other than Section 5 of the State Employees Group Insurance Act of 1971 and other than the changes made to the Illinois Pension Code by this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly), executive order or administrative regulation relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment and employment relations, the provisions of this Act or any collective bargaining agreement negotiated thereunder shall prevail and control…. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to replace the necessity of complaints against a sworn peace officer, as defined in Section 2(a) of the Uniform Peace Officer Disciplinary Act, from having a complaint supported by a sworn affidavit.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) above, any collective bargaining contract between a public employer and a labor organization executed pursuant to this Act shall supersede any contrary statutes, charters, ordinances, rules or regulations relating to wages, hours and conditions of employment and employment relations adopted by the public employer or its agents….12
In other words, state law must cede to policies in a document that has been negotiated by an unelected and unaccountable third party.
In police union contracts, that includes provisions related to how investigations of accused officers are conducted. Any attempt to make internal investigations and discipline more effective could prove futile as long as unions are allowed to undermine reforms simply by bargaining for their preferred policies through contract negotiations.
Illinois lawmakers attempted to address the power of Section 15 through criminal justice reform legislation in early 2021. The General Assembly considered a bill that amended the IPLRA to exclude provisions related to discipline or discharge of peace officers from the list of issues that must be negotiated by public employers.13 While it did not amend Section 15 directly, it could have at least prevented union contracts from including disciplinary provisions that could subsequently trump state law.
But that bill was not enacted. Instead, a different criminal justice reform bill was passed that may do little to address systemic problems related to the internal investigations of officer misconduct.14 And because it did not amend the provision in Section 15 that gives police contracts greater power than other state laws, enforcement of its provisions related to anonymous complaints and records retention is questionable, as discussed in Part 2.15 While the General Assembly may have intended well, it missed the mark in truly addressing the failure of police officer investigation and disciplinary processes.
Until the General Assembly explicitly reins in the power it granted unions through the IPLRA, police unions likely will continue negotiating provisions that protect bad actors at the expense of the reputation of the majority of officers who serve their communities honorably.
Police union contracts in the top 10 largest municipalities include provisions that inhibit investigation and discipline of officer misconduct
In 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois issued a report discussing several provisions in Chicago’s contract with the Fraternal Order of Police that inhibit proper investigation and discipline of officers who engage in misconduct.16
But provisions hindering internal investigations and discipline don’t just appear in contracts with the city of Chicago. They also appear in many of the police union contracts in the other largest municipalities in the state.17
These include provisions prohibiting anonymity of complaints, restricting interrogations of accused officers when investigations are initiated, providing special information to accused officers, subjecting imposed discipline to a lengthy appeal procedure and hiding investigations from subsequent review.
Provisions prohibiting anonymity of complainants
Municipalities with contract provisions: Rockford,18 Springfield,19 Waukegan20 and Cicero21
Four of the largest municipalities prohibit investigations of police misconduct if based upon anonymous complaints.
The contracts in Rockford and Springfield explicitly require complaints be accompanied by a sworn affidavit, thereby prohibiting anonymity of complainants.22
Similarly, Waukegan requires accused officers be given the names of all complainants before an administrative proceeding begins, and Cicero requires accused officers be given the names of all complainants before an interrogation begins, thereby placing a de facto prohibition on anonymity in the contracts.23
In its report, the DOJ found the prohibition of anonymity directly impedes the ability to investigate and identify legitimate instances of misconduct.24 The report explained there are many valid reasons a complainant may want to submit a complaint anonymously – including if the complainant is a fellow officer.25
The DOJ investigation also found the affidavit requirement “creates a tremendous disincentive to come forward with legitimate claims and keeps hidden serious misconduct that should be investigated.”26 Those who have lost faith in police accountability or who fear police retaliation may choose not to submit a sworn affidavit.27
Another consequence of an affidavit requirement: it can take weeks or even months to obtain an appropriate affidavit, which delays the investigation and the preservation of evidence.28
The legislation enacted by the Illinois General Assembly attempted to address anonymous complaints and required affidavits in its 2021 criminal justice reform – but it may have little effect.
The enacted legislation amends both the State Police Act and the Uniform Peace Officers’ Disciplinary Act to prohibit requirements that complaints filed against police officers include a sworn affidavit.29
Both of the newly enacted provisions attempt to prevent union contracts from overruling the new prohibitions. For instance, the Uniform Peace Officer’s Disciplinary Act now includes the following: “This ban on an affidavit requirement shall apply to any collective bargaining agreements entered after the effective date of this provision.”30
But the bill did not amend Section 15 itself, meaning that provision is still in place. That leaves two conflicting statutes: the IPLRA, which states union contracts trump conflicting laws, and the Uniform Peace Officers’ Disciplinary Act, which states contracts cannot require sworn affidavits.
From the face of the statutes, the IPLRA and its supersedence clause should control because it explicitly states it controls when there is a conflict in laws. At the very least, police unions have no incentive to discontinue demands for affidavit requirements in future contracts. If that happens, a state court would need to decide which provision controls and whether the General Assembly can change the IPLRA without actually amending the IPLRA.
Provisions restricting interrogations of accused officers
Municipalities with contract provisions: Aurora,31 Springfield,32 Peoria,33 Champaign,34 Waukegan35 and Cicero36
Six of the largest municipalities have union contracts with provisions restricting the timing of interrogations in ways that favor the accused officer.
The most common restriction is the interrogation must be conducted at a “reasonable hour” or “reasonable time,” but some contracts go farther.
The contract in Springfield provides that if the interrogation of an accused officer cannot happen when the officer is on duty, the officer is eligible to receive overtime compensation.37
In Waukegan and Cicero, the contracts provide that the interrogation be of “reasonable duration” and the officer be allowed rest periods.38
The contrast between this treatment and that afforded civilians in interrogations is stark. Sleep deprivation, lengthy interrogations, middle-of-the night questioning and even refusal to allow basic physical necessities are methods used in civilian interrogations, and confessions obtained through these methods have been upheld by courts.39
Provision providing special information to accused officers
Six of the municipalities maintain union contract provisions that mandate certain information be given to an accused officer before an interrogation.
As one study has stated, “[t]hese kinds of provisions stack the deck in favor of police officers and may make it difficult to uncover the truth.”46
The contract in Aurora simply requires the accused officer be given the nature of the charges before an interrogation.47 In Naperville, the accused officer must be notified in person and in writing of the alleged violations at the outset of the investigation.48
But some contract provisions go much farther.
In Rockford, Waukegan and Cicero, the accused officer must be given the names of complainants before the interrogation.49 Not only does this give the officer information to use in shaping his or her answer, it also acts as a deterrent to witnesses coming forward and filing complaints.50
The contracts in Waukegan and Cicero also require accused officers be given the name, rank and unit or command of the officer in charge of the investigation, the names of interrogators and all persons present during the interrogation.51 In Waukegan, the officer must also be given all relevant body camera video prior to giving a statement.52
And in Champaign, the contract requires accused officers be given a copy of the allegation, existing evidence and names of any witnesses at least 72 hours before the interrogation.53
Provisions granting officers special access to evidence – including copies of civilian complaints, the names of complainants and/or video evidence – hamper the ability of internal investigators to determine the truth and check claimed timelines.54
In the criminal context, investigators use multiple techniques to elicit statements from civilian suspects, including lying, misleading, tricking and even discussing non-existent evidence.55 But the above-outlined union contract provisions stand in the way of such interrogation techniques when it is an officer that is accused of misconduct.56
In a nationwide survey of police leaders, 97% of respondents concluded providing the accused with evidence before an interrogation – including access to a complaint, complainants’ names and video evidence – would either frequently or occasionally burden an investigation.57
As one respondent in the survey noted, “‘[s]howing [suspects] evidence in advance allows them to tailor their lies to fit the evidence,’ thereby reducing the ‘suspect’s uncertainty about the investigation.’”58
Moreover, numerous researchers have found delayed interrogations, or “interrogation buffers” such as that inherent in Champaign’s 72-hour waiting period, also raise accountability concerns.59 Such rigid time delays “create a greater likelihood that officers may be able to use a delay period to coordinate stories in a manner that could circumvent accountability.”60
State law could be amended to prohibit accused officers from obtaining special information before interrogations, but these contract provisions would win out under Section 15 of the IPLRA.
Provisions subjecting discipline to a lengthy appeal procedure
Municipalities with contract provisions: Aurora,61 Naperville,62 Joliet,63 Rockford,64 Springfield,65 Elgin,66 Peoria,67 Champaign,68 Waukegan69 and Cicero70
All 10 of the largest municipalities have union contract provisions subjecting discipline to a lengthy appeal procedure.
Some experts think these procedures, known as grievance and arbitration procedures, stand in the way of real accountability.71 Typically, the grievance procedure itself includes multiple steps of appeal; it can then be followed by binding arbitration.72 A binding decision effectively allows the arbitrator to overrule decisions by a police chief, mayor or other city leaders.73
And because of these appellate procedures, police departments are often forced to rehire or reduce disciplinary actions against officers who have engaged in misconduct.74
A 2017 investigative report by the Washington Post found that since 2006, at least 1,881 officers had been fired from 37 of the nation’s largest police departments for misconduct; but departments were forced to reinstate more than 450 of these officers, most of whom regained their jobs when police chiefs were overruled by arbitrators.75
Notably, all 37 departments had police union contracts guaranteeing appeals of disciplinary measures.76
As the report stated, “[t]he nearly 1,900 firings and the 451 rehirings show both how rare it is for departments to fire officers and how difficult it is to keep many of those from returning.”77
One police chief explained, “It’s demoralizing to the rank and file who really don’t want to have those kinds of people in their ranks.”78 And it also triggers “a tremendous amount of anxiety in the public.”79
At the very least, the DOJ report found “[p]ursuing the grievance procedure adds an average of three years to the disciplinary process” – and it is only after that time any discipline not overturned in the process can be imposed.80
Provisions hiding investigations from subsequent review
Municipalities with contract provisions: Aurora,81 Naperville,82 Joliet,83 Rockford,84 Springfield,85 Elgin,86 Peoria,87 Champaign,88 Waukegan89 and Cicero90
All 10 of the largest municipalities maintain union contract provisions that provide for the destruction of some or all records pertaining to disciplinary files after a certain amount of time.
For the public, this means less accountability. If an officer has a repeat incident that happens after previous records were destroyed, previous incidents may not be taken into account when considering discipline.
The DOJ report found such provisions deprived CPD of important discipline and personnel documentation that assists in monitoring patterns of officer misconduct.91 That is significant, considering the DOJ also found officers “often” repeat misconduct, including the unreasonable use of deadly force.92
That has certainly been the case in Chicago. For example, former Chicago officer Jerome Finnigan, who admitted to robbing criminal suspects while a member of the city’s Special Operations Section, had been the subject of 68 citizen complaints.93 Similarly, former Chicago police officer Aldo Brown was the subject of 16 complaints that never led to discipline. Brown was later convicted of using excessive force when video showed him attacking a man lying on the ground.94
The legislation enacted by the Illinois General Assembly in 2021 amends the Local Records Act to require that all public and nonpublic records related to complaints, investigations and adjudications of police misconduct be permanently retained.95 But according to Section 15 of the IPLRA, provisions in contracts allowing for destruction of records nullify that mandate. And unlike the bill provisions related to anonymity of complaints, the legislation did not try to address records provisions in collective bargaining agreements at all.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently considered a provision in the city of Chicago’s contract with the Fraternal Order of Police requiring the destruction of all disciplinary investigation records after five years.96 The court ruled union contracts, and arbitration awards based on those contracts, cannot trump state law where a “public policy exception” exists.97
But that framework, in which the court evaluates on a case-by-case basis whether some contract provisions are contrary to public policy, does not prevent the perpetuation of bad contract provisions. And it isn’t clear the court’s decision on the destruction of records extends to union contracts it wasn’t considering in that case. There’s also no guarantee all police departments throughout the state are aware of the decision and will implement it in the next round of negotiations. Moreover, there’s nothing discouraging unions from continuing to put these provisions in contracts and taking a “wait and see” approach.
Most Illinoisans think Section 15 of the IPLRA should be changed
To weed out abusive officers – and protect the reputations of the officers who serve honorably – statutory reforms are necessary.
Specifically, the Illinois General Assembly should amend the IPLRA to remove the provision in Section 15 allowing union contracts to outweigh state law, or at the very least to limit the subjects that can be negotiated between a government unit and “peace officers.”98
As long as the provision in Section 15 remains in place, giving collective bargaining agreements more weight than state law, police unions likely will attempt to negotiate for problematic disciplinary provisions, threatening the enforcement of future reforms.
Recent polling suggests most Illinois households – including most union households – think the supersedence provision in Section 15 should be changed.99
When asked whether provisions in a police union contract, such as provisions providing for disciplinary processes, should carry more weight than provisions in state law, 51.4% answered “no” – including 52.2% of union households.
Moreover, 50.9% of Illinoisans polled said that law should be changed, including 51.2% of union households.
Notably, the call to amend Section 15 is bipartisan, with 54% of Democrats and 50.1% of Republicans polled indicating they think the law should be changed.
There’s currently a bill pending that would do just that. House Bill 3891 would exclude police union contracts from the language in Section 15, meaning those contracts would no longer be allowed to carry more weight than other laws.100 A second bill, House Bill 3892, would limit negotiations by police unions to compensation only.101 While it would not touch the powerful language in Section 15, it would at least prevent union contracts from including disciplinary provisions that could subsequently nullify state law.
Now it’s time for the Illinois General Assembly to listen to the people and take action.
Conclusion
Months of unrest and protests followed the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd in 2020. Yet despite reform efforts, one of the biggest obstacles to effective police reform persists in Illinois: police unions can undermine efforts to investigate and discipline problem officers through collective bargaining agreements.
Until the IPLRA is amended, police union contracts will continue to trump the good intentions of police reform advocates.
Endnotes
1 “Public Perceptions of the Police,” Council on Criminal Justice (2020), https://counciloncj.org/page/PublicPerceptionsofthePolice.
2 “‘I can’t breathe’: Video shows George Floyd pinned down by police,” The Wall Street Journal (May 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/video/i-cant-breathe-video-shows-george-floyd-pinned-down-by-police/79888134-045F-4175-A25A-A97FA6E50ED2.html.
3 Derek Hawkins, “Officer charged in George Floyd’s death used fatal force before and had a history of complaints,” The Washington Post (May 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/05/29/officer-charged-george-floyds-death-used-fatal-force-before-had-history-complaints/.
4 See Philip K. Howard, “Out of control: Why public employee unions don’t serve the public’s best interest,” USA Today (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/02/23/how-curb-power-public-employee-unions/4538685001/ (“But Chauvin should not have been on the job, and he likely would have been terminated or taken off the streets if police supervisors in Minneapolis had the authority to make judgments about unsuitable officers. … Police union contracts make it very difficult to terminate officers.”).
5 See United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office, “Investigation of Chicago Police Department,” 7, 47 (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download; Mailee Smith, “How Illinois’ collective bargaining rules protect police misconduct,” Illinois Policy Institute, (2020) https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/how-illinois-collective-bargaining-rules-protect-police-misconduct/.
6 DOJ Report at 47.
7 5 ILCS 315/15.
8 While the Illinois General Assembly attempted to rein in the effect of collective bargaining agreements on the investigation and disciplinary processes within police departments, its efforts may have fallen short. See infra Parts 1, 2.
9 See Part 3, infra.
10 5 ILCS 315/1 et seq.
11 5 ILCS 315/2.
12 5 ILCS 315/15 (emphasis in bold added). The one exception related to police officers ensures complaints against them are supported by a sworn affidavit. It does not ensure the public is protected against bad union policies.
13 Amendment 2 to House Bill 163, https://ilga.gov/legislation/101/HB/10100HB0163sam002.htm.
14 See, e.g., House Bill 3653, Illinois General Assembly 2019-2020, https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3653&GAID=15&DocTypeID=HB&LegID=120371&SessionID=108&SpecSess=&Session=&GA=101; Dan Petrella, “Gov. J.B. Pritzker signs sweeping Illinois criminal justice overhaul, which will end cash bail starting in 2023,” Chicago Tribune (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-jb-pritzker-criminal-justice-bill-20210222-nw7lh3upy5aipap2odh7jaofke-story.html.
15 See Part 2, infra.
16 See United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney’s Office, “Investigation of Chicago Police Department,” (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download; Mailee Smith, “How Illinois’ collective bargaining rules protect police misconduct,” Illinois Policy Institute (2020), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/how-illinois-collective-bargaining-rules-protect-police-misconduct/.
17 The top 10 largest municipalities outside of Chicago are Aurora, Naperville, Joliet, Rockford, Springfield, Elgin, Peoria, Champaign, Waukegan and Cicero. See “Illinois cities by population,” https://www.illinois-demographics.com/cities_by_population. The Illinois Policy Institute reviewed all police-related union contracts in these municipalities. The contracts initially were obtained via the internet; where contracts were expired, the Illinois Policy Institute sent Freedom of Information Act requests to ensure utilization of the most up-to-date contracts. While the Institute reviewed 23 total contracts from these cities, this report highlights only those that involve police officers, or “patrol officers,” who are most likely to come into contact with the public. We are not addressing provisions in contracts with sergeants, desk clerks, police auxiliary, etc., unless those positions are also covered in the contract with patrol officers.
18 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Unit Six of the Police Benevolent and Protective Association and City of Rockford, Illinois (Jan. 1, 2015 – Dec. 31, 2018), 15.9(B) (outlining timeline for investigation after “complaint against an employee supported by a sworn affidavit”) (emphasis added).
19 Agreement between City of Springfield and Police Benevolent and Protective Association Unit No. 5 (March 1, 2018 – Feb. 28, 2022), § 14.6(A)(5) (“Any citizen filing a complaint against a sworn peace officer must have the complaint supported by a sworn affidavit…”) (emphasis added).
20 Agreement between the City of Waukegan, Illinois, and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 13.5 (requiring accused be informed of complainants’ names before interrogation).
21 Illinois FOP Labor Council and Town of Cicero: Police officers (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2020), 7.2(D) (requiring accused be given names of all complainants before interrogation).
22 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Unit Six of the Police Benevolent and Protective Association and City of Rockford, Illinois (Jan. 1, 2015 – Dec. 31, 2018), 15.9(B); Agreement between City of Springfield and Police Benevolent and Protective Association Unit No. 5 (Mar. 1, 2018 – Feb. 28, 2022), 14.6(A)(5).
23 Agreement between the City of Waukegan, Illinois, and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 13.5; Illinois FOP Labor Council and Town of Cicero: Police officers (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2020), § 7.2(D).
24 DOJ Report, at 51.
25 DOJ Report, at 51. The hesitancy of officers to speak out against another officer is seen as a “code of silence” – an unwritten rule that officers won’t report misconduct by fellow officers. A prime example: the shooting of Laquan McDonald by Jason Van Dyke, after which Van Dyke’s fellow officers reported that he had acted in self-defense against McDonald. The video dashcam proved otherwise. See Steve Chapman, “Chicago’s ‘code of silence’ went on trial – and the code won,” Chicago Tribune (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/steve-chapman/ct-perspec-chapman-laquan-police-code-silence-0120-20190117-story.html.
26 DOJ Report, at 50.
27 DOJ Report, at 51. The numbers in Chicago bore witness to the impact of the affidavit requirement. Between 2011 and 2014, the Independent Police Review Authority closed – i.e., did not investigate – 58% of total complaints because there was no affidavit. Id. at 50.
28 DOJ Report, at 73.
29 House Bill 3653, Illinois General Assembly 2019-2020, 49, 94-95, https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/101/HB/10100HB3653lv.htm.
30 House Bill 3653, Illinois General Assembly 2019-2020, 94, https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/101/HB/10100HB3653lv.htm.
31 Collective bargaining agreement between the city of Aurora and the Association of Professional Police Officers (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 16.1(1) (stating that whenever an employee is interrogated, “such an interrogation shall be conducted at a reasonable hour…”) (emphasis added).
32 Agreement between City of Springfield and Police Benevolent and Protective Association Unit No. 5 (March 1, 2018 – Feb. 28, 2022), § 14.6(A)(1) (“Unless the exigencies of the situation dictate otherwise, the interrogation of an officer shall be at a reasonable hour, preferably when the officer is on duty. An officer not on duty called in for interrogation shall be eligible for overtime compensation.”) (emphasis added).
33 Collective bargaining agreement between the city of Peoria, Illinois, and Peoria Police Benevolent Association (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 16.3 (stating that when a request for counsel is made following an incident where an employee’s actions result in death or serious injury to another, “no interview or interrogation or questioning shall proceed, nor shall any written statement of report be required to be submitted, until reasonable time and opportunity are provided to the employee to obtain counsel”) (emphasis added).
34 Illinois FOP Labor Council and city of Champaign: Patrol and Sergeant (July 1, 2018 – June 30, 2021), § 32.6(B) (stating that in the case of a departmental investigation initiated by written complaint, “unless the exigencies of the situation dictate otherwise, the interrogation of an officer shall be at a reasonable time, preferably when the officer is on duty) (emphasis added).
35 Agreement between the city of Waukegan, Illinois, and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 13.6 (“All interrogations shall be conducted at a reasonable time of day. Whenever the nature of the alleged incident and operational requirements permit, interrogations shall be conducted during the time when the officer is on duty.”); id. at § 13.8 (“Interrogation sessions shall be of reasonable duration and shall permit the officer investigated reasonable periods for rest and personal necessities.”) (emphasis added).
36 Illinois FOP Labor Council and town of Cicero: Police officers (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2020), § 7.2(a) (“All interrogations shall be conducted at a reasonable hour, preferably at a time when the Patrol Officer is on duty.”); id. at § 7.2(e) (Interrogation sessions shall be for reasonable periods and shall be timed to allow for such personal necessities and rest periods as are reasonably necessary.”); id. at § 7.2(i) (“The interrogation shall be suspended at the request of any Patrol Officer under investigation for a reasonable time until representation can be obtained.”) (emphasis added).
37 Agreement between City of Springfield and Police Benevolent and Protective Association Unit No. 5 (Mar. 1, 2018 – Feb. 28, 2022), § 14.6(A)(1).
38 Agreement between the city of Waukegan, Illinois, and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 13.8; Illinois FOP Labor Council and Town of Cicero: Police officers (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2020), § 7.2(e).
39 Stephen Rushin & Atticus De Prospo, “Interrogating police officers,” George Washington Law Rev., Vol. 87, (May 2019), 646, 656, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=facpubs (“Nevertheless, courts have found confessions to be voluntary in many other questionable circumstances, including when the confession was the apparent product of… lengthy interrogations, sleep deprivation combined with middle-of-the-night questioning, [and] refusal to allow basic physical necessities…”).
40 Collective bargaining agreement between the city of Aurora and the Association of Professional Police Officers (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 16.1(2) (stating that prior to the interrogation, the accused officer must be given the nature of the charges) (emphasis added).
41 Collective bargaining agreement by and between the city of Naperville and the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council/F.O.P. Lodge #42 (Jan. 1, 2020 – Dec. 31, 2024), § 10.2 (“Employees who are the subject of a disciplinary investigation shall be notified in person and in writing of the alleged violation(s), including the General Order(s) allegedly violated at the outset of the investigation.”) (emphasis added).
42 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Unit Six of the Police Benevolent and Protective Association and city of Rockford, Illinois, (Jan. 1, 2015 – Dec. 31, 2018), § 15.9(B) (“the employee shall receive notification in writing of the allegations made against the employee including the name of complainant (which may be a member of the RPD) and a copy of the complaint….”) (emphasis added).
43 Illinois FOP Labor Council and City of Champaign: Patrol and Sergeant (July 1, 2018 – June 30, 2021), § 32.6(A) (providing that an officer shall be provided a copy of the allegations at least seventy-two (72) hours prior to the time of the officer’s appearance before an investigatory panel and providing that the allegations shall indicate the existing evidence and names of any witnesses).
44 Agreement between the city of Waukegan, Illinois, and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 13.5 (requiring the accused officer be informed prior to interrogation the nature of the investigation and, if an administrative proceeding is instituted, the names of all complainants); id. at § 13.7 (“The officer under investigation shall be informed of the name, rank and unit or command of the officer in charge of the investigation, the interrogators, and all persons present during any interrogation except at a public administrative proceeding.”); id. at § 13.22 (“All relevant [body camera] videos relevant to a specific incident shall be made available for viewing to all officers involved in that incident for a reasonable time, prior to giving a statement or preparing a report in reference to the incident.”) (emphasis added).
45 Illinois FOP Labor Council and town of Cicero: Police officers (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2020), § 7.2(C) (“The Patrol Officer under interrogation shall be informed of the name, rank, and command of the officer in charge of the investigation, the interrogating officer, and all persons present during the interrogation.”); id. at § 7.2(D) (“The Patrol Officer under investigation shall be informed in writing of the nature of the complaint prior to any interrogation and of the names of all complainants.”) (emphasis added).
46 Stephen Rushin & Atticus De Prospo, “Interrogating police officers,” George Washington Law Rev., Vol. 87 (May 2019), 646, 693, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=facpubs.
47 Collective bargaining agreement between the city of Aurora and the Association of Professional Police Officers (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 16.1(2).
48 Collective bargaining agreement by and between the city of Naperville and the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council/F.O.P. Lodge #42 (Jan. 1, 2020 – Dec. 31, 2024), § 10.2.
49 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Unit Six of the Police Benevolent and Protective Association and city of Rockford, Illinois (Jan. 1, 2015 – Dec. 31, 2018), § 15.9(B); Agreement between the city of Waukegan, Illinois and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 13.5; Illinois FOP Labor Council and town of Cicero: Police officers (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2020), § 7.2(D).
50 See provisions prohibiting anonymity of complainants, supra.
51 Agreement between the City of Waukegan, Illinois and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 13.7; Illinois FOP Labor Council and Town of Cicero: Police officers (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2020), § 7.2(C).
52 Agreement between the City of Waukegan, Illinois, and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 13.22.
53 Illinois FOP Labor Council and City of Champaign: Patrol and Sergeant (July 1, 2018 – June 30, 2021), 32.6(A).
54 Stephen Rushin & Atticus De Prospo, “Interrogating police officers,” George Washington Law Rev., Vol. 87, (May 2019), 646, 690, 692, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=facpubs.
55 Stephen Rushin & Atticus De Prospo, “Interrogating police officers,” George Washington Law Rev., Vol. 87, (May 2019), 646, 692, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=facpubs.
56 Stephen Rushin & Atticus De Prospo, “Interrogating police officers,” George Washington Law Rev., Vol. 87, (May 2019), 646, 649, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=facpubs (“These [civilian] interrogations commonly involve ‘psychological tactics’ including the use of deception. As a number of legal scholars have observed, the law gives police officers wide discretion in the kinds of interrogation tactics they can use against civilians.”). See also id. at 654 (“[C]ourts and legislators grant investigators wide latitude to use any interrogation tactics that do not undermine the voluntariness of a statement made by a criminal suspect. By contrast, a complex web of labor and employment regulations prevent internal investigators from using many of these same tactics against police officers suspected of misconduct or unlawful behavior.”).
57 Stephen Rushin & Atticus De Prospo, “Interrogating police officers,” George Washington Law Rev., Vol. 87, (May 2019), 646, 671, 677-78, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=facpubs.
58 Stephen Rushin & Atticus De Prospo, “Interrogating police officers,” George Washington Law Rev., Vol. 87, (May 2019), 646, 679, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=facpubs.
59 Stephen Rushin & Atticus De Prospo, “Interrogating police officers,” George Washington Law Rev., Vol. 87, (May 2019), 646, 660-61, 663-64, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=facpubs.
60 Stephen Rushin & Atticus De Prospo, “Interrogating police officers,” George Washington Law Rev., Vol. 87, (May 2019), 646, 660-61, 664-65, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=facpubs.
61 Collective bargaining agreement between the city of Aurora and the Association of Professional Police Officers (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 22.1(B) (“Any dispute which arises wherein an employee shall be removed, suspended or discharged shall be through the Grievance Procedure as hereinafter set forth. A suspension of more than three (3) days or discharge shall be filed as a grievance commencing at Step IV.”); § 22.2(D) (allowing grievances to be submitted to arbitration); § 22.2(E) (giving the union the sole discretion to refer a grievance to arbitration and making the decision final and binding on both parties).
62 Collective bargaining agreement by and between the city of Naperville and the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council/F.O.P. Lodge #42 (Jan. 1, 2020 – Dec. 31, 2024), § 9.1 (providing “suspensions of five (5) days or less and reprimands may be subject to the grievance procedure” and “[d]isciplinary actions of five (5) days or more shall be subject to appeal either through the grievance procedure or the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, at the election of the employee.”); § 9.3 (allowing the union to refer the grievance to arbitration); § 9.4 (making the decision of the arbitrator final and binding on the city, union and employees).
63 Collective bargaining agreement between city of Joliet and Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 5.2(a) (“If an employee wants to contest recommended discipline the Chief of Police or the Chiefs [sic] designee will hold an Administrative Review meeting. Upon completion of the Administrative Review, the Chief of Police will issue a Final Decision as to discipline…. At the employee’s option, disciplinary action against the employee may be contested either through the arbitration procedure in Sub-section (b) below or through the Joliet Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (BOFPC), but not both.”); § 5.2(b)(7) (making the Arbitrator’s decision final and binding on all parties).
64 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Unit Six of the Police Benevolent and Protective Association and City of Rockford, Illinois, (Jan. 1, 2015 – Dec. 31, 2018), § 15.9(D) (providing any suspensions or discharges against employees may be appealed either through the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners or, subject to approval by the union, through the grievance and arbitration procedure); see id. § 15.9(E) (providing oral reprimands, corrective action/recognition notices and written reprimands are not subject to appeal); § 15.9(F) (providing expedited arbitration for suspensions of thirty (30) days or less).
65 Agreement between city of Springfield and Police Benevolent and Protective Association Unit No. 5 (Mar. 1, 2018 – Feb. 28, 2022), § 6.2 (Step 1) (providing timing in which to file grievances in discipline cases); § 6.3 (providing grievances not settled in accordance with the arbitration procedure can be referred by the union for binding arbitration); § 6.4 (making the arbitrator’s decision final and binding); § 14.2(A) (making disciplinary charges seeking termination or suspension in excess of five days subject to jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission or the grievance procedure, at the officer’s option); § 14.2(B) (making disciplinary charges seeking a second suspension within a six month period subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission or the grievance procedure, at the officer’s option); § 14.2(C) (making disciplinary actions of 30 days and discharges subject to expedited arbitration procedure); § 14.2(D) (making suspensions of five days or less within the exclusive review jurisdiction of the Discipline Review Board or the grievance procedure, at the officer’s option).
66 Agreement between city of Elgin and Policemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association Unit #54 (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 14(a) (allowing grievance of matters involving discharge, suspension or discipline and providing disciplinary grievances shall be initiated at Step 4 of the grievance procedure); see id. (making the grievance and arbitration procedure the sole recourse for appealing such disciplinary action); id. at Step 5 (providing union may refer a grievance to arbitration if not settled and making the decision of the arbitrator final and binding).
67 Collective bargaining agreement between the city of Peoria, Illinois, and Peoria Police Benevolent Association (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 16.4 (providing the review of any disciplinary action by the Chief of Police or his designee shall be grievable and allowing the union to proceed to arbitration if the employee is not satisfied with the resolution of the grievance); § 5.2 (allowing only the union to refer grievances to arbitration); § 5.5 (making the arbitration decision final and binding).
68 Illinois FOP Labor Council and city of Champaign: Patrol and Sergeant (July 1, 2018 – June 30, 2021), § 32.4 (making written reprimands, suspensions without pay and suspensions with a recommendation for discharge appealable through the grievance and arbitration procedure); § 33.2 (“Written reprimands may be referred by the UNION to arbitration, utilizing the expedited arbitration procedure.”); id. (“For suspensions without pay, suspensions with a recommendation for discharge or all appealable dismissals under Article 31.2B, the City Manager’s decision may be appealed to arbitration. Other matters concerning the application of this Agreement may be appealed to an arbitrator by the UNION. Suspensions of more than ten (10) days, suspensions with a recommendation for discharge and appealable dismissals under Article 31.2B may, alternatively, be appealed to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.”); § 33.3 (“If the individual officer wishes to appeal a grievance related suspension for more than ten (10) days, dismissal or discharge, he/she may request a hearing before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.”); § 33.4 (providing only the union has authority to refer grievances to arbitration); § 33.5 (“The decision of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners or the arbitrator shall be final and binding on all parties. This shall not prevent the filing of an Administrative Review Action in Circuit Court by either the CITY or the UNION.”).
69 Agreement between the city of Waukegan, Illinois, and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 7.1 (providing that discipline short of discharge, demotion or suspension may be grieved but not beyond step 4, meaning it is not eligible for arbitration).
70 Illinois FOP Labor Council and town of Cicero: Police officers (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2020), § 11(B)(3) (providing that suspensions of five days or less can be appealed before the Cicero Board of Fire and Police Commissioners or before an arbitrator); § 11(B)(4) (providing that suspensions for more than five days may be appealed before the Cicero Board of Fire and Police Commissioners or before an arbitrator); § 11(B)(5) (providing that discharge may be appealed before the Cicero Board of Fire and Police Commissioners or before an arbitrator); § 11(C)(2)(e) (providing the decision of the arbitrator shall be binding on the parties).
71 See Martha Bellisle, “Fired repeatedly, but back on the job: Police officers in misconduct cases routinely return to force through arbitration process,” Chicago Tribune (June 24, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-nw-police-misconduct-arbitration-20200624-de63ttai3nh6hpfefb6ruf64yi-story.html.
72 Of the 10 municipalities, only Rockford and Waukegan do not mention binding arbitration in their contracts with police unions. See Collective Bargaining Agreement between Unit Six of the Police Benevolent and Protective Association and city of Rockford, Illinois, (Jan. 1, 2015 – Dec. 31, 2018), §§ 15.9(D) and 15.9(F); Agreement between the city of Waukegan, Illinois, and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – Apr. 30, 2022), 7.1.
73 Stephen Rushin, “Police disciplinary appeals,” Univ. of Penn. Law Rev., Vol 167, (Feb. 2019), 545, 548-49, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9652&context=penn_law_review.
74 Stephen Rushin, “Police disciplinary appeals,” Univ. of Penn. Law Rev., Vol 167, (Feb. 2019), 545, 550, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9652&context=penn_law_review; see also id. at 573-74 (“A number of scholars and media outlets have hypothesized that arbitration as an appellate mechanism may contribute to the frequent reversals of or reductions in internal disciplinary sanctions.”).
75 Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery and Steven Rich, “Fired/rehired: Police chiefs are often forced to put officers fired for misconduct back on the streets,” Washington Post (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/.
76 Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery and Steven Rich, “Fired/rehired: Police chiefs are often forced to put officers fired for misconduct back on the streets,” Washington Post (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/.
77 Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery and Steven Rich, “Fired/rehired: Police chiefs are often forced to put officers fired for misconduct back on the streets,” Washington Post (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/.
78 Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery and Steven Rich, “Fired/rehired: Police chiefs are often forced to put officers fired for misconduct back on the streets,” Washington Post (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/
79 Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery and Steven Rich, “Fired/rehired: Police chiefs are often forced to put officers fired for misconduct back on the streets,” Washington Post (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/
80 DOJ Report, at 81.
81 Collective bargaining agreement between the city of Aurora and the Association of Professional Police Officers (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 16.3 (“Summary of Administrative Action reports (SAAs) shall be purged from the employee’s personnel file after 18 months, or three years in the case of a reoccurring deficiency”).
82 Collective bargaining agreement by and between the city of Naperville and the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council/F.O.P. Lodge #42 (Jan. 1, 2020 – Dec. 31, 2024), § 7.2 (providing records of investigations shall be expunged in the following ways: exonerated – immediately (shall not be used in future disciplinary proceeding); unfounded – immediately (shall not be used in future disciplinary proceeding); not sustained – immediately (shall not be used in future disciplinary proceeding); training/verbal counseling/reprimand – after one year; sustained/written reprimand – after two years; sustained suspension (traffic crash related only) – after two years; sustained suspension – after four years, unless an allegation involving excessive force, sexual harassment, discrimination, dishonesty in the performance of official police duties or criminal conduct); sustained suspension for substance abuse – after six years; sustained allegation of misconduct involving excessive force, sexual harassment, discrimination, dishonesty in the performance of official police duties or criminal conduct – may be used in future disciplinary proceedings to determine credibility, notice and the appropriate penalty).
83 Collective bargaining agreement between city of Joliet and Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 24.3 (providing prior suspensions of five days or fewer shall not be used to aggravate current disciplinary action if the prior suspension occurred at least five years ago and there has been no other discipline of any type during that five years); id. (providing prior oral or written reprimands shall not be used to aggravate current disciplinary action if the prior reprimand occurred at least three years ago and there has been no other discipline of any type during that three years).
84 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Unit Six of the Police Benevolent and Protective Association and city of Rockford, Illinois, (Jan. 1, 2015 – Dec. 31, 2018), § 15.9(A) (providing disciplinary action slips in an employee’s file shall accumulate each year until completion of annual evaluation and then be destroyed); id. (providing written reprimands may be used for disciplinary purposes for a period not to exceed one year, except for vehicle violations, which may be used for a period not to exceed three years); § 15.9(B) (“Any unfounded, unsubstantiated, or not sustained citizen or internal complaint filed against an employee shall not be used for purposes adverse to the employee after two (2) years of the original filing of the complaint.”).
85 Agreement between city of Springfield and Police Benevolent and Protective Association Unit No. 5 (March 1, 2018 – Feb. 28, 2022), § 14.9(B) (“Any record of reprimand punishment may be used for a period of time not to exceed one (1) year (three (3) years in the case of vehicle use violations) and shall thereafter not be used to support or as evidence of adverse employment action.”); § 14.9(c) (“Any record of discipline greater than a reprimand shall be expunged five (5) years from the date of suspension pursuant to the criteria established in paragraph (D).”); § 14.9(D) (providing the department “shall review the Internal Affairs file list on a quarterly basis to determine which files are eligible for expungement/destruction”); see also § 14.9(A) (providing that any file material that is not available for the officer’s review shall not be used in any manner or any form adverse to the officer’s interests).
86 Agreement between city of Elgin and Policemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association Unit #54 (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 25(c) (providing for the expungement of disciplinary records, excluding excessive force or alleged criminal conduct, in the following ways: sustained/not sustained/exonerated/unfounded/policy failure/administratively closed – after five years; oral/written reprimands – after five years; disciplinary suspension – retained permanently; disciplinary orders involving violation of anti-harassment/non-discrimination policies – retained permanently; disciplinary terminations – retained permanently; allegations of excessive force/criminal conduct – retained permanently, even if unfounded, not sustained, exonerated, a policy failure or administratively closed).
87 Collective bargaining agreement between the city of Peoria, Illinois, and Peoria Police Benevolent Association (Jan. 1, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2019), § 16.7 (allowing for expungement of records in the following manner: oral reprimand – after one year; written reprimand – after two years; disciplinary suspension – remains permanently).
88 Illinois FOP Labor Council and city of Champaign: Patrol and Sergeant (July 1, 2018 – June 30, 2021), § 20.3 (providing that no citizen complaint shall be placed in an officer’s personnel file if it is not accompanied by a specific disciplinary action related to the complaint); § 20.4 (providing written reprimands shall be removed from file after two years passes, provided the officer has not received any further disciplinary actions and further providing removed reprimands shall not be used in disciplinary matters except when the officer alleges the absence of reprimands when they exist in fact).
89 Agreement between the city of Waukegan, Illinois, and Waukegan Police Benevolent Labor Committee Unit #42 (May 1, 2018 – April 30, 2022), § 17.3 (providing disciplinary investigation files will be destroyed after three years, unless the investigation relates to a matter which has been subject to either civil or criminal court litigation prior to the expiration of the three year period, and then it will be destroyed two years after the date of final adjudication unless a violation is found or a pattern of alleged infractions exists).
90 Illinois FOP Labor Council and town of Cicero: Police officers (Jan. 1, 2016 – Dec. 31, 2020), § 15.3(A) (providing files related to oral reprimands shall not be used adversely one year from the date issued); § 15.3(B) (providing files related to written reprimands shall not be used adversely two years from the date issued, unless they show a pattern or practice of the same misconduct or there has been a disciplinary infraction during that two year period); § 15.3(C) (providing files related to suspensions may be used adversely to the officer’s interests).
91 DOJ Report, at 52.
92 DOJ Report, at 5.
93 See Timothy Williams, “Chicago rarely penalizes officers for complaints, data shows,” The New York Times (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/few-complaints-against-chicago-police-result-in-discipline-data-shows.html; Frank Main, “Crooked ex-cop wants out of prison early for informing on others,” Chicago Sun-Times (Sept. 15, 2016), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2016/9/15/18373897/crooked-ex-cop-wants-out-of-prison-early-for-informing-on-others.
94 See Timothy Williams, “Chicago rarely penalizes officers for complaints, data shows,” The New York Times (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/few-complaints-against-chicago-police-result-in-discipline-data-shows.html.
95 House Bill 3653, Illinois General Assembly 2019-2020, 65-66, https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/101/HB/10100HB3653lv.htm.
96 See City of Chicago v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7, 2020 IL 124831 (Ill.), https://courts.illinois.gov/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2020/124831.pdf; see also Mailee Smith, “Illinois Supreme Court denies Chicago police union request to destroy misconduct records,” Illinois Policy Institute, (June 19, 2020), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-supreme-court-denies-chicago-police-union-request-to-destroy-misconduct-records/.
97 See City of Chicago v. Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge No. 7, 2020 IL 124831 (Ill.), https://courts.illinois.gov/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2020/124831.pdf.
98 “Peace officers” are defined in the IPLRA as “any persons who have been or are hereafter appointed to a police force, department, or agency and sworn or commissioned to perform police duties, except that the following persons are not included: part-time police officers, special police officers, auxiliary police as defined by Section 3.1-30-20 of the Illinois Municipal Code, night watchmen, “merchant police,” court security officers as defined by Section 3-6012.1 of the Counties Code, temporary employees, traffic guards or wardens, civilian parking meter and parking facilities personnel or other individuals specially appointed to aid or direct traffic at or near schools or public functions or to aid in civil defense or disaster, parking enforcement employees who are not commissioned as peace officers and who are not armed and who are not routinely expected to effect arrests, parking lot attendants, clerks and dispatchers or other civilian employees of a police department who are not routinely expected to effect arrests, or elected officials.” 5 ILCS 315/3(k).
99 Results for this poll are based on automated telephone interviews conducted among a statewide sample of 512 likely voters. Data for this survey research was collected by Cor Services.
Interviews were conducted via a computer-assisted telephone interviewing system utilizing techniques designed to achieve the highest possible respondent cooperation. The surveys were conducted Nov. 30 to Dec. 4, 2020.
The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 4.33 percentage points. The margin of sampling error may be higher for certain subgroups. Results presented may not always appear to total 100% because of rounding.
Data was sampled using weighted demographic information from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey Voting and Registration Supplement and state election authorities. Demographic information for actual voters in past elections was used to construct sample target weights.
Illinois Policy paid for all costs associated with this survey.
100 House Bill 3891, https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3891&GAID=16&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=132977&SessionID=110&GA=102.
101 House Bill 3892, https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3892&GAID=16&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=132978&SessionID=110&GA=102.